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Surgery of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years now, Indian tribes have turned to casino gambling and other
betting games to fund tribal activities.' In order to regulate Indian gaming activities,
Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).2 Before IGRA was en-
acted, the Supreme Court concluded in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi-
ans3 that the federal government controlled Indian gaming, and states could become
involved in Indian gaming only when Congress expressly provided for state action."
Relying on the Cabazon holding, Congress subsequently enacted IGRA which specifi-
cally delegated more power to the states in connection to Indian gaming activities.'
Through IGRA, Congress achieved two worthy but competing goals. First, IGRA
invited greater state participation in the Indian gaming regulatory process.6 Second,
IGRA safeguarded tribal interests by authorizing tribes to sue states in federal court
when states fail to negotiate gaming compacts in good faith These two competing
goals coexisted in a delicate balance because Congress allowed for greater state in-
volvement but also provided a federal forum to remedy a potential abuse of state pow-
er against a tribe.'
1. The federal government has allowed some Indian tribes to set up casinos in order to promote
tribal economies. See infra note 15. Congress possesses the authority to regulate commerce with Indian
tribes under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see infra note
38. Furthermore, the federal government has promised economic assistance to Indian tribes' in both
treaties and agreements. See discussion infra Part III.A.
2. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
3. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
4. Id. at 207. The Supreme Court reasoned:
"tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government not
the States," . . . . It is clear, however, that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians
on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.
Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colvilles Indian Reservation', 447 U.S. 134, 154
(1980)).
5. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. I 1997) (allowing tribes to conduct Class III
gaming, see infra note 20, only if such activity is permitted to any entity for any purpose by the state
where the tribe is located); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(1)(C) (permitting tribes to conduct Class Ill gaming
only in accordance with a Tribal-State compact).
6. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1 1997) (discussing Tribal-State compacts).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
8. IGRA provides:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over -
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to
enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-
State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith,
(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class In gaming
activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact
entered into under paragraph (3) that is in effect, and




Recently, the Supreme Court has disturbed IGRA's delicate balance in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida.9 In Seminole, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the
provision which allowed tribes to sue states in federal court when states fail to negoti-
ate gaming compacts in good faith. 0 As a result, Indian tribes are still subjected to
state regulation but can no longer seek relief against a state or state official in federal
court. Since the Seminole decision, a recent federal district court allowed a state IGRA
suit against a tribal official." Thus, federal courts have made Indian tribes more vul-
nerable than states to lawsuits under IGRA. As noted in part II of this Note, this result
is clearly against Congressional intent.
In this Note, I argue that the Supreme Court should not have declared unconstitu-
tional the IGRA provision which authorizes tribes to sue states in federal court. First,
the Supreme Court ignored the legislative history of IGRA. Second, the Court failed to
contemplate the history of tribal sovereignty. Finally, the Court overemphasized states'
rights concerns and glossed over government functions and separation of powers con-
siderations.
Part II of this Note discusses the legislative history of IGRA based on the Act's
language and Congressional materials. Additionally, part II examines the status of
Indian gaming before the enactment of IGRA and describes how IGRA was created to
fime-tune this status. Part III of this Note shows that the delicate balance reached in
IGRA would not have been disturbed if the Supreme Court had first applied a govern-
ment functions test and then balanced states' rights and separation of powers concerns.
Moreover, part III illustrates how the Seminole decision has disrupted the delicate bal-
ance created in IGRA. This part also describes the history of tribal sovereignty and
shows how the Supreme Court has overestimated the strength of state sovereign immu-
nity in light of Indian sovereignty. Part IV presents proposed changes to IGRA as well
as possible judicial remedies to repair the damage caused by the Supreme Court in its
Seminole decision.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IGRA established a comprehensive system of checks and balances among tribes,
states, and the federal government. Congress desired to preserve tribal sovereignty, to
include the states, and to make the relationship between the three governments more
predictable. 2 Congress specifically intended to prevent courts from balancing these
interests on their own. 3 IGRA balanced these interests and assigned distinct roles to
the tribal, state, and federal players. Since Congress had already considered states'
rights in the equation, the Seminole Court's withdrawal of a provision for the sake of
states' rights has upset the delicate balance.
Indian gaming strikes at the core of basic federalism concerns of states' rights
and federal rule. IGRA does not ignore or eliminate state interests.' 4 In enacting
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
9. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
10. Id. at 1131-32.
11. See Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 63 F.3d 1030, 1051
(11th Cir. 1995).
12. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076.
13. Id.
14. IGRA provides:
Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the
gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a
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IGRA, Congress favored tribal and federal interests over state interests. 5 Congress
wanted to preserve a long tradition of tribal sovereignty. 6 During the creation of
IGRA, the states expressed concern that Indian gaming would be infiltrated by orga-
nized crime and thus required protection through federal and state regulation. 7 How-
ever, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs reported that there had been not
one proven incident of organized crime in the fifteen years of Indian gaming prior to
IGRA.' t Congress also recognized ulterior motives: states did not want Indian casinos
to compete with state-run lotteries and private casinos. 9
The purpose of IGRA is clearly set out in the Act's language. Substantive provi-
sions of IGRA encompass a categorical approach to gaming regulation. IGRA sepa-
rates Indian gaming into three classes with different degrees of regulation.2' The Act
designates who maintains authority over particular types of Indian gaming and what
remedies are available to the parties involved. As part of the larger regulatory scheme,
IGRA allows tribes to sue states in federal court if they do not negotiate certain gam-
ing compacts (Class I) in good faith.2'
Indian tribes believed that IGRA was a compromise: states were allowed some
involvement in the regulation process, and in exchange, tribes were able to sue states
State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gam-
ing activity.
25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
15. IGRA states:
The purpose of this Act is -
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means
of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate
to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the
Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gam-
ing is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gam-
ing on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands,
and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet
congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of
generating tribal revenue.
25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
16. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3071-72. The
Senate Report notes that "the issue has been how best to preserve the right of tribes to self-govern-
ment." Id.
17. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075.
18. Id.
19. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 33 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3103.
20. The Senate Report to IGRA summarized the Congressional classification of Indian gaming as
follows:
Class I (ceremonial gaming). - Traditional gaming remains within the exclusive juris-
diction of Indian tribes and outside the scope of the Act
Class 11 (bingo, lotto, pull tabs, tip jars, punch boards and card games, with the specif-
ic exclusion of banking card games such as chemin de fer, baccarat and blackjack). -
Class II continues to be within tribal jurisdiction but will be subject to oversight regula-
tion by the National Indian Gaming Commission; care [sic] games must be played under
state-mandated hour and pot limits, if any.
Class III (all gaming that is not class I or class II, i.e., banking cards, all slot ma-
chines, casinos, horse and dog racing, jai-alai). - Tribes-may engage in class III gam-
ing if they enter into tribal-State compacts for the operation of tribal class IlI games.
S. REP. No. 100-446, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3077.
21. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1994). For a description of Class III gaming compacts, see supra
note 20.
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in federal court when states did not comply with the process."2 Tribes continue to be-
lieve that they possess the sovereign right to conduct gaming on their reservations.
And through IGRA, Congress had persuaded tribes to compromise. By accepting gam-
ing rules and regulations, tribes would be protected against state interference." In
fact, tribes indicated that an outright federal prohibition of certain kinds of gaming was
a more attractive alternative than state regulation. 4 Legislative proposals to revise
IGRA and court decisions have attempted to give states more control over Indian gam-
ing and have ignored the pro-Indian purposes behind IGRA.
Congress enacted IGRA in response to the California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians decision." The Supreme Court found that Indian gaming fell under the
control of the federal government, and states could only become involved when Con-
gress expressly provided for state action." In Cabazon, the Court reasoned that a
state's fear of organized crime infiltration was not enough to trample tribal sovereign-
ty." IGRA was passed in the wake of Cabazon to give only a limited participatory
role to the states. The Cabazon decision established that the federal government could
continue to maintain authority over Indian gaming regulation.' In no way was IGRA
meant to change the federal stronghold over this regulation. Although IGRA brought
the states into the process, the Act carefully restricted the states' role by making them
amenable to suit in federal court.'
M. THE SEMINOLE DECISION'S DISRUPTION OF THE IGRA BALANCE
A. History of Tribal Sovereignty
In the earlier days of treaties and in the present days of legislation, the federal
government has considered tribal sovereignty a critical factor in its decision-making
process. For example, Congress recognized a long tradition of tribal sovereignty when
it enacted IGRA. ° In addition, the Supreme Court noted in Cabazon that it had "con-
sistently recognized that Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.".'3 The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
22. Telephone Interview with Karen J. Funk, Legislative Specialist at Hobbs, Straus, Dean &
Walker (a law firm specializing in American Indian matters) (Sept. 20, 1995).
23. Id.
24. The Senate Report notes:
Tribes generally opposed any effort by the Congress to unilaterally confer jurisdiction
over gaming activities on Indian lands to States and voiced a preference for an outright
ban of class Im games to any direct grant of jurisdiction to States.
S. REP. No. 100-446, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3074.
25. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
26. Id. at 207.
27. Id. at 221-22. The Supreme Court held:
We conclude that the State's interest in preventing the infiltration of the tribal bingo en-
terprises by organized crime does not justify state regulation of the tribal bingo enterpris-
es in light of the compelling federal and tribal interests supporting them. State regulation
would impermissibly infringe on tribal government, and this conclusion applies equally to
the county's attempted regulation of the Cabazon card club.
Id.
28. Id. at 207.
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
30. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3071-72.
31. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (citing United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
[Vol. 24:149
1 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
the federal government have supported Indian programs in order to preserve and en-
courage tribal sovereignty.
Tribal sovereignty is evidenced today in tribal schools, tribal health clinics, and
tribal courts. Tribal sovereignty is distinguishable from state sovereignty. For instance,
federal legislation that creates and funds tribal governmental activities stems from
treaties between the federal government and the Indian tribes. Felix S. Cohen, an Indi-
an law expert who has traced Indian law back to the historical days of treaties, com-
pared Indian tribes with foreign nations when he noted that "treaties with Indian tribes
are of the same dignity as treaties with foreign nations[,] a view which has been re-
peatedly confirmed by the federal courts and never successfully challenged."32 Cohen
concluded that "numerous treaty provisions establish [tribes'] status as dependent na-
tions."" Payment and services to tribes are promised consideration in treaties and
agreements. For example, in exchange for land the federal government promised com-
pensation and services to Indian tribes.34 The federal government should seek to pro-
tect Indian gaming from state interference because the federal government has made
treaty and now legislative promises to Indian tribes to help them obtain economic self-
sufficiency.
B. Seminole Tribe v. Florida: The Supreme Court's Botched Surgery of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
The Supreme Court attacked the delicate balance created in IGRA. In March of
1996, the Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida35 declared that the IGRA provision
which allowed for tribes to sue states in federal courts was unconstitutional because it
violated states' Eleventh Amendment' sovereign immunity.37 In response to the
Seminole Tribe's attempts to sue the State of Florida for failing to negotiate a gaming
compact in good faith, the Supreme Court asserted that Congress did not have the
power to draft such a provision because it did not possess the authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause.3
32. FELIX X. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 33-34 & n.4 (Five Rings Corp. 1986)
(citing Holden v. Joy, 17 Will. 211, 242-43 (1872); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832);
Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251)).
33. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 44.
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. This Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Id.
37. Seminole, 116 S. CL at 1131-32. Sovereign immunity is defined as the following:
A judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without its
consent. Founded on the ancient principle that "the King can do no wrong," it bars
holding the government or its political subdivisions liable for the torts of its officers or
agents unless such immunity is expressly waived by statute or by necessary inference
from legislative enactment.
BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. In its holding, the Court overruled the Pennsylvania v. Un-
ion Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989), plurality which found that Congress possessed the authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity when it enacted legislation pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Essentially, the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause are found in the
same part of the Constitution, but courts and legislators use their specific names when referring to
them in their particular contexts. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution states that Congress shall
1998]
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Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the federal government has exclusive authori-
ty over the regulation of Indian gaming.39 Since Seminole took away a state limit but
left the tribal limits in place in IGRA, the Court contravened directly against Congres-
sional intent to balance state and tribal interests.
Three critical factors have emerged in courts' analyses of state sovereign immu-
nity: 1) federalism, 2) separation of powers, and 3) government functions. Additional-
ly, the case law concerning state sovereign immunity has also played a role in how
courts decide whether to apply the doctrine.' The focus on federalism advanced by
the Supreme Court in Seminole's majority was appropriate because the Supreme Court
preserves states' rights, particularly those constitutionally-proscribed, such as the Elev-
enth Amendment. However, the Seminole majority should have addressed government
functions and separation of powers concerns as alluded to in the Seminole dissents."
The historical underpinnings of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity as
discussed in case law show that the Court should first apply the relevant government




The provision in IGRA which authorizes tribes to sue states in federal court
implicates Constitutional provisions that cause tension between a supreme national
govemment and states. First, under the Commerce Clause, the Constitution has autho-
rized Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.43 Second, under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Constitution has provided for state government immunity from suit in
particular circumstances.M Third, under Article Ill, the Constitution has given Con-
gress some discretion in expanding the scope of federal court jurisdiction.45 By over-
emphasizing the Eleventh Amendment protection of states, the Supreme Court under-
emphasized the importance of a supreme national government.
When the Supreme Court in Seminole held that Congress could only abrogate
state sovereign immunity when it enacts legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,'M the Court neglected to consider the scope of Congress' ability to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under federal court jurisdiction. Under federal court jurisdic-
tion, Congress may authorize appellate review in the Supreme Court and lower federal
have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987). See also su-
pra note 24 (discussing how Indian tribes recognized that the federal government could ban Indian
gaming as well as determine the scope of state participation in the regulation of Indian gaming).
40. See infra Part llI.B.1.
41. Justice Stevens alluded to separation of powers concerns when he argued that the majority's
approach ends exclusive federal control over such areas as bankruptcy. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra Part II.B.2. Justice Souter addressed government functions concerns
when he distinguished prospective relief from retrospective relief in his Ex pane Young discussion.
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1178-81 (Souter, J., dissenting). See infra Part Ill.B.3.c.
42. See infra Part llI.B.2.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
45. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 2. This clause states that in cases in which the Supreme Court
does not have original jurisdiction, "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Id.
46. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996).
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courts.' This Constitutional grant does not eliminate state sovereign immunity.
Examining the structure of the government created by the Constitution, Alexan-
der Hamilton made several assertions which support the supremacy of the national
government. First, he rationalized that lower federal courts were necessary so that state
courts would not determine "matters of national jurisdiction."' Second, Hamilton
maintained that the United States Supreme Court had original jurisdiction where a state
shall be a party in order to preserve the public peace.49 Third, Hamilton reasoned that
"[t]he evident aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the causes of the specified
classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in
the courts of the Union."5 0 Finally, Hamilton noted that the national legislature pos-
sessed the authority to expressly prohibit state jurisdiction." Hamilton's assessment of
the Constitution and the United States government structure envisioned a narrow scope
for state sovereign immunity to protect states' rights.
Justice Brennan developed a diversity theory interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment in his dissent in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon.52 First, he argued
that since the Eleventh Amendment tracked Article III language, the Amendment was
only meant to restrict jurisdiction based on party status.53 Second, Brennan suggested
that the Eleventh Amendment was created amidst the assumption that noncitizens and
aliens would sue states in federal court when states defaulted on their Revolutionary
War debts.54 Third, Brennan found that the diversity theory approach to reading the
Eleventh Amendment had a historical basis in the ratification debates because both
Federalists and anti-Federalists believed that the Constitution abrogated state sovereign
immunity." Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that Justice Marshall's perception of
the Eleventh Amendment in several cases paralleled Brennan's perception, because
Justice Marshall understood that "neither Article I nor the Eleventh Amendment
limits the ability of the federal courts to hear the full range of cases arising under
federal law."'56 Justice Brennan's diversity jurisdiction interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment and the history and case law which support his interpretation demonstrate
that the protection of states' rights has not been the sole consideration underlying the
Eleventh Amendment.
The history surrounding the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment illustrates
47. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 2.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 546 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
49. Id. at 548.
50. Tm FEDERAuST No. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
51. Id. at 555-57.
52. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this
case, an applicant for employment sued a state hospital for violating the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Id. at 236. The Supreme Court conceded that Congress possessed the authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment state sovereign immunity when it acted pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 238. However, the Court held that Congress failed to abrogate state sovereign immunity
because Congress did not clearly express this intent in the piece of legislation in question. Id. at 247.
Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
53. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 286-87.
54. Id. at 262.
55. Id. at 278-79.
56. Id. at 298. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Osborn v. Presi-
dent of the Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 115 (1809); Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
1998]
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that it was never considered a complete protection for states' rights. In Chisholm v.
Georgia,57 Justice Blair pointed to the language of Article III and reasoned:
our Con[s]titution mo[s]t certainly contemplates ... the maintaining [of] a ju-
ri[s]diction again[s]t a State, as [a] Defendant[,]... a State, by adopting the
Con[s~titution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United
States, [s]he has, in that re[s]pect, given up her right of [s]overeignty."
Focusing on how feudal sovereignties and governments founded on compacts are dif-
ferent, Chief Justice Jay also relied on Article III's language but further reasoned that
feudal sovereignties in England and Europe were different from the popular sovereign-
ty in the United States because the former rested in the Prince or King and the latter
rested in the people.59 In addition to the plain language argument of Article III and
the govermrent structure argument, which each support a narrow view of sovereign
immunity, the history of the time period supported such a reading. Judge Gibbons
looked at the Chisholm decision within the historical context of the Peace Treaty of
1783 and concluded that "treaty rights of the British creditors" and "the holders of
property" required federal court jurisdiction for effective enforcement.'
Clearly, the Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to Chisholm. The
Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana6' noted that Chisholm "created such a shock of
surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed."62 Justice
Souter's Seminole dissent noted that the shock theory regarding the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment was questionable because "Congress was in session when
Chisholm was decided, and a constitutional amendment in response was proposed two
days later, but Congress never acted on it, and in fact it was not until two years after
Chisholm was handed down that an amendment was ratified."63 The Supreme Court
failed to look at all the history surrounding the Eleventh Amendment when it narrowed
its concerns to the protection of states' rights.
Another argument for a narrow reading of the Eleventh Amendment's protection
of state governments is that the concern of an encroaching federal government has
been ignored in the context of suits against local governments. As illustrated in Mount
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,6' the Supreme Court has upheld the
notion that local governments are amenable to suits in federal courts.65 This history
suggests that the Seminole majority overestimated how much federal court jurisdiction
would encroach upon states' rights. The majority's decision to restrict Congress' ability
to expand federal court jurisdiction is discussed in the next section.
57. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
58. Id. at 451, 452.
59. Id. at 471-72.
60. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1923 (1983).
61. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
62. Id. at 11.
63. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1149 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
65. Id. at 280-81.
[Vol. 24:149
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
2. Separation of Powers
The Supreme Court unconstitutionally entered into a legislative role when it
rewrote the IGRA provision drafted by Congress specifically to address tribal sover-
eignty. The Court should have assessed general separation of powers considerations in
its determination of state sovereign immunity. Indeed, the Constitution requires sepa-
ration of legislative powers in a congressional body and adjudicative powers in a judi-
cial body.'
Many acts of Congress "authorize judicial review [when] a private person...
wishes to take the initiative in challenging official action." 7 For example, the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act specifies that "[any person aggrieved by a final order of the
[National Labor Relations Board] ... may obtain a review of such order in any [ap-
propriate] United States court of appeals." The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 9 provides "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."7 The above provisions reflect Congress'
attempt to balance the power of the judiciary against the power of the executive in
implementing legislative programs and policies.
The Seminole majority failed to take into account separation of powers in its
discussion of the strength of state sovereign immunity. In terms of the structure of the
Constitution, the Seminole majority suggested that Congress could not bypass the con-
stitutional limits placed upon federal jurisdiction.7 In its analysis of the relationship
between Congress and federal court jurisdiction, the majority projected the notion that
Congress' ability to expand federal court jurisdiction was severely limited by Article
III.72 The majority further cautioned that the powers of Congress could not be used to
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In asserting that the Tribe's suit should be
dismissed for lack of federal court jurisdiction, the majority reasoned, "The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used
to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."" The
Court overlooked that although Article III defines the scope of judicial power, it also
gives Congress the authority to expand federal court jurisdiction. 4
Although the majority downplayed the power of Congress to expand federal
court jurisdiction, the majority pointed to the power of Congress to create alternative
and thus more appropriate remedies, and asserted that the Ex parte Young doctrine
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONsT. art. M, § 1.
67. RicHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 999-1000 (4th ed. 1996).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
71. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996).
72. Id. at 1127-28 (1996). See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-
98 (1984) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment reflects "the fundamental principle of sovereign immu-
nity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Article III"). See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1988) (recognizing that Congress, under Article I, expanding the scope of the
federal court's jurisdiction under Article III "contradict[s] our unvarying approach to Article III as
setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal court jurisdiction"), overruled by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
73. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2.
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(that government officials cannot hide from suit due to their official status)" could
not be applied in this case. The majority found that "[t]he narrow exception to the
Eleventh Amendment provided by the Ex parte Young doctrine cannot be used to
enforce § 2710(d)(3) because Congress enacted a remedial scheme, § 2710(d)(7), spe-
cifically designed for the enforcement of that right. '76 This finding is inconsistent be-
cause the majority concluded that the alternative scheme was unconstitutional. 7
Justice Stevens believed that the Seminole case was about the power of Congress
and acknowledged that even Justice Iredell" recognized this power.79 In addition,
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's approach "prevents Congress from provid-
ing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in
copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the
regulation of our vast national economy.""0 Although federal courts have the authority
to make sure Congress does not violate the Constitution and give federal courts more
jurisdiction than is allowed under Article III, the Supreme Court neglected to remem-
ber that Congress, not the Supreme Court, has the power to define the scope of federal
court jurisdiction. Because the Supreme Court overstepped its constitutional role in
Seminole, the Court essentially made an attempt to legislate and thereby violated the
principle of separation of powers.
3. Government Functions
A government functions inquiry has proposed the following question: will the
cause of action in question prevent the government from performing its functions?
Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine established to prevent the incapacitation of
government. Different factors affect this consideration, such as who is sued and what
type of remedy is sought. If the Supreme Court asked the above question in Seminole,
it would have concluded that the suit against Florida was permissible. In the context of
regulating Indian gaming, a lawsuit to ensure fairness between a state and a tribe in the
negotiation process does not hinder government functions.
a. Type of Conduct by the Official
The concept of official responsibility is evident in sovereign immunity analysis
and the historical context of suits against government officials. In Little v. Barreme,8
1
a case involving a federal official who engaged in a trespass unauthorized by federal
law, the Supreme Court ruled that federal officials could not shield themselves from
consequences of illegal conduct such as common law trespass.82 This finding suggests
that government officials should still be held accountable for their actions.
75. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.c.
76. Seminole, 116 S. CL at 1133.
77. Id. at 1131-32. The alternative scheme was the provision that allowed tribes to sue states in
federal courts.
78. Justice Iredell dissented in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See supra Part
1I.B.1 (discussing how-the Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to Chisholm).
79. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
80. Id. at 1134 n.1. Thus, according to the Seminole Majority, cases such as In re Merchants
Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a bank-
ruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a State under the Bankruptcy Code), must be
wrong.
81. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S: (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
82. Id. at 179.
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Another distinction in the sovereign immunity analysis is whether the scope of
this immunity not only extends to sovereigns and individuals who act in their official
capacity for the sovereigns but also applies to officials of the sovereigns who act in
their individual capacities. In United States v. Lee,83 the heirs of the Lee estate, which
was illegally taken by the federal government, sued the government agents who held
the land.84 The Supreme Court held that a government official could be sued in his
official capacity for injunctive relief because "[a]ll officers of the government... are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it." 5 The Lee decision demonstrates that
courts should consider whether the halt of an official's conduct infringes upon the
effective administration of the government or simply assures that the official complies
with the law.
b. Form of Relief Sought
In deciphering between a suit against the sovereign and a suit against the offi-
cers, courts have focused on whether such an action interferes with public administra-
tion and whether such a suit dips into the public treasury. In Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman,"6 the Supreme Court stated that the issue was whether the
relief sought had "an impact directly on the State itself." 7 The case dealt with the
conditions of care for the mentally retarded at a state institution.8 The Court conclud-
ed that the form of relief sought, increased funds for and support of a state institution,
made the case one against the state. 9 The Court held that sovereign immunity barred
suit against the state institution and state officials based on state law.' However, the
Court conceded that relief could be granted to the respondents under federal law.9
Therefore, courts should permit suits which are initiated to bring states into compliance
with federal law.
The Supreme Court has established discrepancies based on the form of relief
sought in determining whether suits against officers in their official capacity would be
prevented by sovereign immunity. These discrepancies have lent further support for a
court to consider the effects on government functions before it determines whether to
uphold sovereign immunity. In Land v. Dollar,' the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff's right "under general law to recover possession of specific property wrongful-
ly withheld" may be enforced against an official and that official cannot plead the
sovereign's immunity against the court's power to afford a remedy.93 Since the Court
distinguished between the type of relief sought and the type of conduct an official was
engaged in and then determined whether a suit is against an official or the sovereign,
the Court intended to preserve certain causes of action against government officials.
83. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id. at 220.
86. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v., Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
87. Id. at 117.
88. Id. at 92.
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id. at 124-25.
91. Id. at 125.
92. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1946).
93. Id. at 736.
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Another discrepancy the Court has proposed in its Eleventh Amendment argu-
ment has been to focus on whether the relief sought was prospective or retrospective.
In Miliken v. Bradley,94 the Supreme Court found the federal district court decree
which ordered the state to pay half the cost of desegregation programs was acceptable
because the remedy was a prospective-compliance remedy. 9 The Court asserted
"[tihat the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does not change the fact that
they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits
of a unitary school system." Because the Supreme Court distinguished prospective
relief from retrospective relief, the Court has provided support for Justice Souter's ac-
ceptance of an Ex parte Young remedy in Seminole, as discussed in the following
section.
c. Ex parte Young
The ruling in Ex parte Young9 provided that government officials should not be
able to hide from suit because of their official status.9 The Court ruled that one can
sue a state official in federal court for alleged unconstitutional conduct and get an
injunction against the official even though one would not be able to sue the state it-
self.' The Court's acceptance of the premise that officers cannot bypass liability sole-
ly based on their "officer" status illustrated that the Court did not interpret sovereign
immunity as an absolute immunity.
The Supreme Court's allowance of broad state powers in Seminole is inconsistent
with Ex parte Young's limitations on broad state powers. By not adhering to Ex parte
Young's limitations, Seminole has placed Indian tribes at an unconstitutional disadvan-
tage.10
°
The federal court ruling in Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indi-
ans of Florida.'. that a tribal official was amenable to suit under Ex parte Young in
accordance with IGRA" suggests that a state official should be amenable to an Ex
parte Young suit in accordance with IGRA as well. 3 The Tamiami case involved a
94. Miliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S, 267 (1977).
95. Id. at 289.
96. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
97. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
98. Id. at 159-60.
99. Id.
100. The Supreme Court has disenfranchised Indian tribal sovereignty in other instances. On June
23, 1997, the Supreme Court concluded that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe did not have an Ex parte Young
remedy against state officials who were acting on land which the Tribe claimed title to in accordance
with federal law. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2043 (1997). The Supreme Court held that
Indian tribes did not have an Ex parte Young remedy against state officials in a quiet title action. Id.
Nonetheless, the courts have not protected Indian tribal officials from suit.
101. Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 63 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir.
1995).
102. Ex parte Young has proposed:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Feder-
al Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with
the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequence of his indi-
vidual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsi-
bility to the supreme authority of the United States.
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
103. Tamiami Partners, 63 F.3d at 1051.
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gaming management company suing tribal officials under IGRA to compel the tribal
officials to arbitrate a dispute." When a state official or tribal official violates the
Constitution, the official no longer acts on behalf of the state or the tribe and thus
should be amenable to suit for violating federal law and should not be protected by
sovereign immunity. As it stands now, an Ex parte Young remedy can be sought
against a tribal official but cannot be maintained against a state official under the same
legislation (IGRA). Therefore, states are given special treatment compared to Indian
tribes, a conclusion clearly unfair to the Indian tribes.
The Seminole Tribe invoked Ex parte Young on the theory that state officials can
be sued for violating the Constitution. The Seminole majority held that the doctrine of
Ex parte Young could not be applied because Congress had constructed an alternative
remedy."0 5 Since the IGRA tribal remedy against the state was deemed unconstitu-
tional, the majority's argument that Congress created an alternative remedy so the
Tribe did not need Ex parte Young was inconsistent."
Justice Souter noted that only one limit on Ex parte Young has ever been ac-
knowledged by the Supreme Court:
Indeed, in the years since Young was decided, the Court has recognized only one
limitation on the scope of its doctrine: under Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 615, 94
S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), Young permits prospective relief only and may
not be applied to authorize suits for retrospective monetary relief."°
Souter acknowledged the importance of Ex parte Young in the structure of the United
States' government."°8 Since the Tribe did not seek retrospective relief, Souter con-
cluded that the Tribe could recover under Ex parte Young."° Therefore, the Seminole
majority's denial of an Ex parte Young remedy against a state official under IGRA
conflicts with the history of the doctrine.
4. Case Law Support
Although Seminole overruled the Union Gas"0 plurality, the Supreme Court
should not ignore its Commerce Clause jurisprudence articulated in that decision."'
Since the federal government's authority to regulate Indian gaming stems from the
Commerce Clause, courts should not ignore Commerce Clause precedents when they
decide the strength of Congress' authority to regulate Indian gaming. For instance, in
104. Id. at 1040.
105. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996). The alternative remedy was the
provision that allowed tribes to sue states in federal courts.
106. The majority argued that Congress did not intend to allow for suit against a state official. Id.
Thus, the Tribe could not subject the governor to suit because of the lack of Congressional intent. The
majority failed to address whether compelling a governor to negotiate with a tribe in good faith af-
fected whether a government could properly function or not.
107. Id. at 1178.
108. Id. at 1180.
109. Id. at 1181.
110. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
111. In the Union Gas plurality, the Court held that a state could be sued in federal court for
violating an environmental protection statute. Id. at 23. The Court reaffirmed that Congress has the




Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.," 2 the Court held that state authority in
performing a traditional state function would not exempt the state from Commerce
Clause regulation."3 The Garcia majority noted that the federal government structure
has facilitated state representation in Congress and that such a structure has sufficiently
limited Congressional actions."
4
5. Conclusion on Seminole
The Seminole majority disregarded part of the history and tradition of sovereign
immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. The Seminole Tribe sought prospective relief
from a government official who violated a federal statute and claimed a remedy creat-
ed by Congress. The precise language of the Constitution, the supremacy of the nation-
al government, the desire for the Court to follow Congressional intent, and the need
for accou,,,bli,., for- a- government official engaging in conduct prohibited by a feueral
law should have convinced the Court to accept Congress' power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause. Since Congress has represented state
interests more than any other branch of the federal government, the Supreme Court
should attempt to create a balance between separation of powers and states' rights
instead of ignoring separation of powers to act mostly for states' rights interests. In
addition, the Supreme Court should remember that sovereign immunity originated in
England not to protect local governments from the King but to protect government
functions.
The Seminole majority first should have conducted a government functions anal-
ysis before analyzing state sovereign immunity in the context of federalism and separa-
tion of powers. Whether state sovereign immunity or federal sovereign immunity is at
stake, a government functions analysis determines if there is a need for such protection
in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION: PROPOSED CHANGES TO IGRA
A. Congressional Proposals Thus Far Have Not Provided for Repair
Although H.R. 1512"' and S. 487 "6 were introduced prior to the Seminole
decision, subsequent proposals have been even less favorable toward Indian tribes." 7
As discussed below, the language of H.R. 1512 and S. 487 conflicted with the restrict-
ed state position towards Indian gaming established by the Supreme Court in Cabazon
and preserved in IGRA. Additionally, these two bills which composed the Fair Indian
Gaming Act attempted to put more power in the hands of the states than IGRA.
Section two of the proposed Fair Indian Gaming Act suggested three changes to
the compact negotiation and approval process outlined in IGRA.' First, the bill rec-
112. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
113. Id. at 555-57.
114. Id. at 556. See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), and Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964),
which both support the conclusion that the Commerce Clause limits state sovereignty.
115. H.R. 1512, 104th Cong. (1995).
116. S. 487, 104th Cong. (1995).
117. Telephone Interview with Karen Funk, Legislative Affairs Specialist at Hobbs, Straus, Dean &
Walker (a law firm specializing in American Indian matters) (February 21, 1997).
118. H.R. 1512, 104th Cong. (1995).
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ommended that the burden of proof shift from the state having to prove it negotiated in
good faith over to the tribe having to prove a state negotiated in bad faith." 9 Second,
the bill prevents tribes from presenting certain evidence of state failure to negotiate in
good faith.2 The third change proposed, "Section 11(d)(3)(B) of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(B)) is amended by striking 'only when' and
inserting 'only after such compact is approved by the legislature and the Governor of
the State and'."'' Essentially, this modification would ensure that state approval pre-
ceded the actual commencement of gaming. Section three of the bill, Gaming on After-
Acquired Lands, would greatly decrease the Secretary of Interior's authority to take
lands into trust and thus would transfer more control over those matters to state gover-
nors and legislatures."2 These subsequent proposed changes to IGRA would have on-
ly weakened tribal sovereignty further than the damage inflicted by the Seminole deci-
sion.
B. What Congress and Courts Should Do
This Note proposes three ways to repair the delicate balance reached in IGRA
but disrupted by the Supreme Court in Seminole. First, IGRA could be repealed and
Indian Gaming could fall back within the plenary power of the federal government in
accordance with Cabazon 23 Although an attractive remedy, particularly for Indian
tribes, this solution is improbable because of Congress' desire to keep the states in-
volved.
Second, Congress could redraft IGRA and require that both states and tribes
waive their sovereign immunity and thus be amenable to suit in federal courts before
the two sides begin any negotiations. If states refused to waive their sovereign immuni-
ty, they would be left out of the process. If tribes refused to waive their sovereign
immunity, they would be stuck with a lengthier process and more administrative hoops
to jump through. Tribes would be susceptible to the whims of particular administra-
tions with varying perceptions of Indian gaming. Another way in which Congress
could redraft IGRA would be to add a specific clause stating that tribes have an Ex
parte Young remedy against the states and states have an Ex parte Young remedy
against tribes.
Finally, in lieu of Congress redrafting IGRA, the courts could repair the damage
in a future case and properly acknowledge Ex parte Young as the appropriate remedy
to this piece of legislation. Also, the Court could overrule part of Seminole and recog-
nize that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity when
it enacts legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. All of these remedies maintain
and preserve the delicate balance between federal, state, and tribal interests.
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